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Abstract Underpinned by the assumption that unemployed persons are passive recip-
ients of welfare, recent welfare reforms have increased benefit conditionality in the UK
and introduced harsher penalties for failure to meet these conditions. Yet, conditional-
ity may result in vulnerable groups disproportionately experiencing disentitlement from
benefits, one of the rights of social citizenship, because they are, in some cases, less able to
meet these conditions. Rising sanctions, then, may be the product of a disconnection be-
tween welfare conditionality and the capabilities of vulnerable claimants. To test this hy-
pothesis, we evaluate whether sanctions are higher in areas where there are more vulner-
able Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants, namely, lone parents, ethnic minorities, and those
with disabilities. We find that sanction rates are higher in local authorities where more
claimants are lone parents or live with a disability, and that this relationship strengthened
since welfare reforms under the Conservative-led coalition. Failure to meet conditions of
benefit receipt may disproportionately affect vulnerable groups.
IǇǍǋǈƽǎƼǍǂǈǇ
Access to welfare benefits has long been predicated on meeting certain conditions, such as be-
ing available for work (Hills, 2015). But recently, the conditions of entitlement have changed,
becoming more stringent (Watts et al., 2014), and the consequences of failing to meet those
conditions have become more severe. These changes have coincided with a doubling of the
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number of sanctions applied to Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimants from a rate of 2.3 sanc-
tions per 100 claimants per month in 2009/10 to 4.5 sanctions per 100 claimants in 2014/15.
In 2015, a Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) Select Committee heard evidence
from frontline agencies documentinghowsanctions disproportionately affect vulnerable groups
(Work and Pensions Committee, 2015), concluding that intensified conditionality has led to
‘some vulnerable individuals… being “set up to fail”’ (Work and Pensions Committee, 2015:
28). In this paper, we conduct a novel quantitative analysis of sanction rates to explore this
hypothesis directly, examining whether the removal of the rights of citizens to social security
are being disproportionately applied to particular groups: the disabled, ethnic minorities, and
lone parents.
CǂǍǂǓƾǇǌǁǂǉ ƺǇƽ ǌǈƼǂƺǅ ǌƾƼǎǋǂǍǒ
The rights of citizenship, according to Marshall (1950), can heuristically be split into three
parts: civic, political, and social. Here, we explore how sanctions affect the social rights of cit-
izenship, which entitles citizens to a ‘modicum of economic welfare’ and ‘to live the life of a
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall, 1950).
The entitlements of citizens are often layered because eligibility to particular components
of citizenship (e.g., civic, political, and social) can be predicated on different principles (Patrick
& Fenney, 2015). Figure 1 illustrates this layering, showing how the full array of rights are
available only to those whomeet all the expectations of citizens pertaining to, for example, the
right to remain and access to social security, whereas people who fail to meet certain condi-
tions can be disentitled from some (but rarely all) of the rights of citizens.1
The layering of British citizenship is partly determined by policy decisions that define the
expectations and entitlements of citizens (Tyler, 2013). Policy, of course, changes; and so gov-
ernments can (suddenly) make it more difficult for some groups to obtain access to certain
entitlements. Successive governments since the 1980s have done just this; redesigning policy
to change the expectations of citizens seeking the social rights of citizenship. Those less able
to meet these expectations have, as a consequence, become more precarious (Edmiston, 2014;
Tyler, 2013).
Although beginning before 2010, this process has been particularly evident in the recent in-
tensification of conditionality for people who are unemployed and deemed able towork (Watts
et al., 2014; Webster, 2016). The Conservative-led coalition – building on reforms imple-
mented under New Labour – adjusted the conditions for claiming JSA to address the problems
(as the government saw them) of profligate public spending and welfare dependency (Hills,
1Somenon-citizens do receive financial support from the state, for example asylum seekers. However, asylum
seekers are not citizens and do not have access to social security. In fact, until they obtain ‘indefinite leave to
remain’ they are have ‘no recourse to public funds’, meaning they are not entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance. In such
circumstances, people in this situation turn to their local authorities for help but there is no statutory guidance
issued to local authorities on their duties to support people with ‘no recourse to public funds’.
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Figure 1: A layered conception of citizenship
2015).
Starting in 2010, the government introduced three major sets of reforms. First, a series of
policy interventionsmoved people deemed able towork from Incapacity Benefit, Employment
Support Allowance, or Income Support onto Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) (DWP, 2014). Sec-
ond, the conditions to obtain JSA became more stringent (Watts et al., 2014). The government
introduced the Work Programme, requiring some claimants to participate in workfare to re-
ceive JSA. Introduced in 2013, the Claimant Commitment created a contractual obligation to
perform certain actions in looking for work (such as attend all Jobcentre Plus appointments as
scheduled and on-time, to spend 35-hours a week looking for work, and applying for a mini-
mum number of jobs per week). Lastly, the penalties (sanctions) for failure to meet these new
conditions became more severe (Adler, 2016).2 All of these reforms have sought to change the
behaviour of citizens without directly addressing the obligations of the state to its citizens to
providework, suggesting these changes are intended, in part, to address the problemofwelfare
spending by activating citizens. To accomplish this, the government have shifted the expecta-
tions and entitlements of social citizenship.
2After the reforms the minimum sanction period became 4 weeks for minor offences and 13 weeks for more
serious offences. In rare cases, claimants could be excluded for as long as 156 weeks (3 years).
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SƺǇƼǍǂǈǇǌ ƺǌ ǀǈǏƾǋǇǆƾǇǍƺǅǂǍǒ
Designing policy to produce a particular kind of citizen is an example of governmentality,
which is the processes or techniques through which the state attempts to alter the behaviour
of citizens (Rose et al., 2006). Recent changes to conditionality and sanctions are examples
of neoliberal governmentality, a particular form of governmentality characterised by ‘perma-
nent vigilance, activity, and intervention’ (Foucault, 2008: 132). Neoliberal governmentality
reconfigures citizenship by creating insecurity and anxiety as a means to motivate activity and
change behaviour (Tyler, 2013); turning failed citizens into productive, active, valued citizens
(Foucault, 2008).
The new conditionality regime articulates a state-dominated view of how the failed and
the active citizen behave. In the specific context of JSA, an active citizen is willing and able
to adhere to the Claimant Commitment and participate in the Work programme. Failure to
conform to the state’s view of the active citizen entails stigma and financial penalties, thereby
institutionalising this new norm of citizenship (Rose et al., 2006).
Key, however, is that this view assumes that JSA claimants are able to meet the Claimant
Commitment. Yet, academics and frontline services have expressed concern that these new
norms of citizenship are incongruent with the capabilities of some JSA claimants, particularly
among thosewho had a limited understanding of English, orwhowere disabled or lone parents
( Johnsen, 2016; Oakley, 2014). Data from aDWP evaluation suggested that between 40-50% of
Universal Credit claimants believed that at least some of the actions in the Claimant Commit-
ment did not ‘take account of personal circumstances’ and were not ‘achievable’ (Adler, 2016).
Moreover, in another study, two thirds of single parentswere not aware therewere ‘flexibilities’
that can allow the jobseeker to tailor conditionalities to their circumstances (Coleman & Riley,
2012); and many single parents do not receive the support they believe they need (Whitworth,
2013). Sanctions may be penalising people who are – in many cases – unable, not unwilling, to
meet these new norms (Work and Pensions Committee, 2015). As a result, the obligations of
this new citizen, created by this policy instrument, may disadvantage some groups of individu-
als more than others, removing the financial protections offered to those who have a different
set of capabilities.
By establishing this new institutionalised norm, conditionality may be inadvertently but
disproportionately excluding some groups from the entitlements of social citizenship. Levitas
and colleagues defined social exclusion as ‘the lack or denial of resources… and the inability
to participate in… normal relationships and activities’ (Levitas et al., 2007). If claimants are
unable to meet the conditions of welfare receipt, resulting in a sanction, we suggest this may
deepen the degree of social exclusion faced by vulnerable groups. First, the sanction removes
income intended to ensure citizens have sufficient resources tomeet their basic needs. Second,
sanctions can lead to engaging in stigmatising behaviour, such as using foodbanks (Loopstra et
al., 2015b). Here, we explore whether there is any evidence the practice of sanctioning may set
up some groups to fail by drawing on a unique dataset matching sanction rates to the demo-
graphic composition of JSA claimants. We ask, is there evidence that groups less able to meet
the conditions of social security receipt are more likely to experience sanctions, and thereby
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be excluded from some of the rights of social citizenship?
DƺǍƺ ƺǇƽ ǆƾǍǁǈƽ
We constructed a novel longitudinal cross-local authority dataset to examine how variation in
JSA claimant characteristics related to sanctioning rates over 2009/10 to 2014/15. Data on the
size of the working age population and themonthly JSA claimant count for local authority dis-
tricts and unitary authorities in England, Scotland, and Wales were obtained from nomisweb.
The monthly number of claimants aged 18-24 and over 60 (excluding pensioners) were also
collected, as well as the monthly number of claimants claiming for 12 months or more. We
used these data to calculate monthly claimant rates per working age adult and the proportion
of claimants who were young, older than 60, and claiming for over 12 months. Monthly rates
were then averaged over fiscal years.
We focused our analysis on three possible at-risk groups: disabled, lone parents, and ethnic
minorities. Informed by evidence from frontline services working with JSA claimants, these
are groups who may be less able to meet the stringent requirements of the Claimant Com-
mitment due to difficulty understanding requirements, restricted ability to make Jobcentre
Plus appointments, or possible discrimination within the workplace or Jobcentre Plus offices.
To obtain detail on claimant characteristics, we acquired a special license to access local area
identifiers for the Annual Population Survey (APS), available from the UK Data Archive, over
2008/2009 to 2014/15. (These data are not available from the DWP). We used these data to
calculate the proportion of JSA claimants in local authority areas who had disabilities, were
lone parents, and who were from an ethnic minority. Disability was defined as those who have
long-term limiting health conditions. We also calculated the number of claimants who had
National Qualifications Framework (NQF) level 4 education or above, measuring the level of
educational attainment among claimants.
A limitation of using APS data to describe claimant characteristics is that sample sizes
are very small for local authorities with small populations, resulting in some cases in too few
claimants to reliably estimate the proportion with these characteristics of interest. Thus, we
restricted our sample to only those local authorities that had sample sizes >600 persons, re-
ducing our sample from 2625 to 1205 local authority-years. In addition, in a number of local
authority-years (n=457), there were no claimants with one or more of the characteristics of
interest (i.e. claimants with disabilities, lone parents, ethnic minorities, or with high levels of
education). We treated these as zeros in our analysis. In reality, these values are underestimates
arising from sampling error, as the true proportions of claimants with these characteristics are
likely to be non-zero. We conducted sensitivity tests to observe how these assumptions af-
fected our findings (see below).
Data on the number of sanctions applied to claimants each month were accessed from
Stat-Xplore by local authorities (DWP, 2016). We used data on the number of adverse sanc-
tions after any successful reviews, reconsiderations, or appeals, reflecting only those decisions
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where claimants received a sanction that was applied and not appealed at a later time. We used
claimant count data to calculate monthly rates of sanctions applied per claimant and averaged
rates over fiscal years. For a specificity test, we also extracted detail on the number of sanctions
where claimants had a disability, were lone parents, or who were non-white to test whether
changes in the composition of JSA claimants were associated with reported sanctions applied
to these groups.
SǍƺǍǂǌǍǂƼƺǅ ƺǇƺǅǒǌǂǌ
To test our hypothesis, we examined how local area sanction rates associated with local area
claimant characteristics, as follows:
Sanctionsit =1Disabilityit + 2Loneparentit + 3EthnicMinorityit
+ 4Educationit + it (1)
Here, i is local authority and t is year. Sanctions is the sanctioning rate, calculated as the
number of adverse sanctions as a percentage of JSA claimants in local authorities. Disability,
LoneParents,EthnicMinorities, andEducation refer to the percentage of claimants with
each characteristic, respectively.  is the error term. Standard errors were clustered at the local
authority level to reflect non-independence of the sampling. Lastly, we weighted our model
estimates by the population of the local authority, giving greater credence to more reliable es-
timates of the socio-demographics of JSA claimants.
In a subsequent model, we adjusted for potential confounders. We added the proportion
of claimants with claims for longer durations (12 months or more), as vulnerable groups may
claim for longer durations which, in turn, can lead to being subject to harsher conditionalities
(e.g. mandatory work programmes). Thus, duration of claims could be one reason why sanc-
tion rates are associated with these claimant characteristics. We also controlled ourmodels for
age of claimants because these characteristics could potentially confound the relationships be-
tween characteristics of vulnerability and sanctioning. Namely, older claimants may be more
likely to have disabilities, but less likely to be sanctioned on account of their age. Younger
claimants are more likely to be sanctioned but less likely to have chronic health conditions
(Work and Pensions Committee, 2015). Lastly, we also include local-authority fixed effects,
thereby controlling for unobserved differences across local-authorities that are constant across
this period.
Next, we tested whether observed associations were robust after accounting for features of
the local labour market, which may explain both the characteristics of JSA claimants and the
sanction rate. To do so, we first examined how the claimant rate in local authorities related
to the sanction rate. Then, we adjusted our models for employment rates, economic inactivity
rates, unemployment rates, and the ratio of Jobcentre Plus vacancies to JSA claimants. The lat-
ter indicator provides ameasure of jobcentre staff’s knowledge of available work for claimants,
while unemployment rates may influence perceptions of available local work among jobcentre
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staff (i.e. in places with low unemployment rates, jobcentre staff may perceive claimants to
have more job opportunities).
We also examined whether the strength of relationships observed between claimant char-
acteristics and sanctioning changed in the years following reforms to JSA conditionalities and
accompanying sanctioning penalties. These changes occurred incrementally from mid-2011
to 2013. We hypothesized that these changes, cumulatively, would result in a stronger rela-
tionship between disadvantaged claimant characteristics and sanctioning outcomes in years
following their implementation. To examine this hypothesis, we tested interactions between
these characteristics with a dummy variable marking years before- and after- reforms (i.e. be-
fore 2012/13 vs. 2012/13 and after).
Descriptive statistics are reported in web appendix 1.
RƾǌǎǅǍǌ
DǂǌƺƻǂǅǂǍǒ, LǈǇƾ PƺǋƾǇǍǁǈǈƽ, EǍǁǇǂƼ MǂǇǈǋǂǍǒ SǍƺǍǎǌ, ƺǇƽ SƺǇƼ-
ǍǂǈǇǂǇǀ
The proportions of JSA claimants with disabilities and who were lone parents were positively
related to the proportions of claimants who were sanctioned (Table 1). For every 1 percentage
point increase in the proportion of claimants with disabilities, the rate of sanctions applied
to claimants rose by 0.03 percentage points (95% CI: 0.024 to 0.040). Similarly, with every
percentage point increase in the proportion of claimants who were single parents, the rate of
sanctions among claimants rose by 0.03 percentage points (95%CI: 0.018 to 0.035). We initially
observed a weak positive association between sanction rates and the proportion of claimants
from ethnic minority groups ( = 0.0039, 95% CI: 0.0001 to 0.0077) but no clear association
with the level of education of claimants.
Next we added the proportion of claimants whose claims were more than 12 months and
the age composition of claimants as well, and included local-authority fixed-effects (Table 1:
Models 2 & 3). We observed higher rates of sanctioning in areas with a higher proportion of
long-term claimants and in areas where more claimants were 55 years or older. But, even after
including these additional controls, our two main findings were unchanged: the sanctioning
rate increased as the proportion of disabled or lone parent JSA claimants in local authorities
also increased.
LǈƼƺǅ ǅƺƻǈǎǋ ǆƺǋǄƾǍǌ, ǌƺǇƼǍǂǈǇǌ, ƺǇƽ ƾǑƼǅǎǌǂǈǇ
These findings were not explained by claimant rates in local authorities or local labour market
conditions. The correlation coefficient between sanction rates and the claimant rate in local
authorities was only 0.087, reinforcing that it is the characteristics of claimants (and not the
claimant rate) that relates to sanctioning rates. Next we tested whether our results changed if
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we adjusted for labour market conditions, including adjusting for employment rates and the
economic inactivity rate. The latter groupmay constitute the ‘hidden unemployed’; those who
are out of work but who economically inactive because they have been unable to find employ-
ment for many years (Beatty & Fothergill, 2013). Our results remained largely unchanged (see
Web Appendix 2). We then considered whether the perceived or real availability of work al-
tered our findings. Again, our results were stable after accounting for thesemeasures of labour
market slack (see Web Appendix 3).
Table 1: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants
and the adverse sanction rate, 2008 to 2014
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1) (2) (3)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.032** 0.015** 0.0089**
disability [0.0039] [0.0035] [0.0033]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.027** 0.017** 0.0066*
lone parents [0.0045] [0.0037] [0.0032]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an 0.0039* -0.0027 -0.0068*
ethnic minority [0.0019] [0.0030] [0.0028]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0024 0.0029 0.0037
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0038] [0.0035] [0.0031]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.056** 0.089**
for over 12 months [0.0067] [0.0062]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.11 -0.57**
[0.067] [0.099]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.024 -0.17**
[0.015] [0.028]
Local-authority fixed-effects N N Y
Constant 1.95** 2.09** 7.18**
[0.16] [0.55] [0.94]
Observations 1205 1205 1205
R2 0.14 0.35 0.55
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
Model 3 includes local authority fixed effects.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
LǈƼƺǅ ǅƺƻǈǎǋ ǆƺǋǄƾǍǌ, ǌƺǇƼǍǂǈǇǌ, ƺǇƽ ƾǑƼǅǎǌǂǈǇ
These findings were not explained by claimant rates in local authorities or local labour market
conditions. The correlation coefficient between sanction rates and the claimant rate in local
authorities was only 0.087, reinforcing that it is the characteristics of claimants (and not the
claimant rate) that relates to sanctioning rates. Next we tested whether our results changed if
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we adjusted for labour market conditions, including adjusting for employment rates and the
economic inactivity rate. The latter groupmay constitute the ‘hidden unemployed’; those who
are out of work but who economically inactive because they have been unable to find employ-
ment for many years (Beatty & Fothergill, 2013). Our results remained largely unchanged (see
Web Appendix 2). We then considered whether the perceived or real availability of work al-
tered our findings. Again, our results were stable after accounting for thesemeasures of labour
market slack (see Web Appendix 3).
IǇƼǋƾƺǌǂǇǀ ƾǑƼǅǎǌǂǈǇ ƺƿǍƾǋ ǐƾǅƿƺǋƾ ǋƾƿǈǋǆǌ
Next we examined whether the observed associations between sanctions and both the propor-
tion of disabled and lone parent JSA claimants were stronger in the period following welfare
reforms and sanction regime changes in 2012. Figure 2 highlights how, before these reforms,
for every 1 percentage point increase in disabled claimants, the sanctioning rate increased by
only 0.006 percentage points, but how in the period of reforms, this association became almost
four times as strong, increasing by 0.016 percentage points. Similarly, the strength of associa-
tion between lone parenthood and sanctioning more than doubled in this period compared to
prior to 2013 (see Web Appendix 4).
SƾǇǌǂǍǂǏǂǍǒ ǍƾǌǍǌ
In a web appendix, we include details of a series of sensitivity checks to ensure our model
was robust to alternate specifications. These include: 1) adjusting for time dummies; 2) in-
cluding all local authorities irrespective of sample size; 3) restricting our sample to only local
authorities with non-zero values on the key socio-demographics; 4) excluding local authori-
ties were estimates suggested all claimants were, for example, disabled; 5) removing weights;
6) weighting by the Annual Population Survey sample size; and 7) using sanction referrals as
the outcome. In all cases our results remain unchanged (see web appendices 5-11 for results).
One puzzle posed by our results is the seeming difference between our regression estimates
and the aggregate level trends for lone parents. Across Great Britain, in any given month, lone
parents are sanctioned at a lower rate than non-lone parent claimants (DWP, 2016), suggesting
that sanction rates should fall as the proportion of lone parent claimants rises. Digging into
this relationship in more detail we find the aggregate data show that as the monthly single par-
ent claimant rate increased so too does the monthly sanctioning rate among single parent (and
total sanctioning rate as well). This association holds even after we adjust for different possi-
ble time trends. Next, we looked more closely at the local authority-level data, testing whether
the association between the sanction rate and the proportion of lone parent claimants varies
across local authorities by the single parent claimant rate. We find that the association between
the sanction rate and lone parents is negative (or flat) in local authorities where there is a low
proportion of lone parent claimants. But this same relationship is positive in local authorities
where the proportion of single parent claimants is high (>10%). In short, our findings from
our cross-local area analyses are not inconsistent with the aggregate-level data. They suggest
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Figure 2: Association between disability and long parents with sanction rates before and after the
change in sanction regime
Notes: Full model is reported in web appendix 2. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. All models include
weighting by local authority size.
that the rate of sanctions per single parent claimant at the aggregate-level may mask impor-
tant variation across local authorities; whichmay lower the average sanction rate among single
parents at the aggregate level (For more details of these analyses see Web Appendix 12).
Lastly, we testedwhether claimant characteristics relatemost strongly to the count of sanc-
tions applied to these specific groups (i.e. the disabled and lone parents). We found more dis-
abled people were sanctioned (as a proportion of total claimants) when there were a larger
proportion of disabled claimants (Web Appendix 13). We also found similar results for lone
parents. These findings give greater specificity to the main finding of this paper; namely that
disproportionately higher sanction rates are driven by disproportionately higher rates of sanc-
tions among disabled and lone parent claimants.
10
DǂǌƼǎǌǌǂǈǇ
The conditionality regime applied to JSA claimants assumes some unemployed people are pas-
sive recipients of welfare and that stricter conditions, coupled with (the threat of) sanctions,
will motivate passive recipients to become active jobseekers (Hills, 2015). Yet, both frontline
services and the Work and Pensions Committee have observed that ‘there remains a danger
that some vulnerable individuals are being “set up to fail” [by the new conditionality regime]’
(Work and Pensions Committee, 2015). Indeed, in our quantitative cross-local authority anal-
yses, we observed that conditionality seems to be inadvertently setting up some vulnerable
groups to fail. Sanctions rates appear to be higher in areas where there weremore disabled and
lone parent JSA claimants. Sanctions rates were not, however, associated with ethnic minority
claimants. Conditionality appears to disadvantage those with ill health, physical limitations,
or uncertain family commitments. These penalties may exclude these individuals from some
of the entitlements of social citizenship: not because they are unwilling but because they are,
in many cases, unable to live up to these new norms of productive and active citizenship.
Changes to conditionality under theConservative-led coalition governmentmayhavemade
things worse, deepening the disadvantage faced by disabled and lone parent JSA claimants. Af-
ter the 2012/2013 reforms, sanctions rates were evenmore closely associatedwith rates of dis-
ability and lone parenthood amongst claimants. This deepening disadvantage may be linked
with the Work Programme and the Claimant Commitment, which have potentially increased
the gap between the expectations of an active citizen and the capabilities of claimants. All
of these interventions in the labour market have been concentrated on the individual rather
than on the number of suitable vacancies for disabled and lone parent JSA claimants. The
consequences of this exclusion could be severe for the material well-being of disadvantaged
claimants, as shown by the link between sanctioning and foodbank use (Loopstra et al., 2015b)
and evidence of conditionality causing destitution (Dwyer & Bright, 2016).
Our results also highlight how the layered nature of citizenship is shaped by policy pro-
cesses (Tyler, 2013). Conditionality and sanctions both serve to create institutionalised norms
of citizenship through the enactment of neoliberal governmentality (Rose et al., 2006); which
seeks to change behaviour through exposing (or threatening to expose) people to precarious-
ness. Further, these policies also alter the nature of social citizenship, redrawing the boundaries
between the deserving and undeserving poor. Our results problematize both this deserving-
ness distinction and this layered notion of citizenship, drawing attention to how changes to
conditionality have encouraged the unemployed to become more active and productive. To
achieve this, these reforms have redefined active citizenship and, in the process, may have cre-
ated failed citizens, i.e., those who are less able to follow these procedures and meet these ex-
pectations, potentially leading to even greater social exclusion for lone parents and those living
with disability.
There are important limitations to our study. First, the data we used to measure the socio-
demographic characteristics rely on small sample sizes and may include measurement error.
However, we found our results were stable when we removed extreme observations and when
we included or excluded local authorities with the smallest samples. Second, some of the mea-
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sures we used do not precisely capture the sources of conflict with the new conditionality
regime (e.g., language barriers faced by some members of minority communities). Similarly,
the disability measure from the Annual Population Survey is subjective, introducing measure-
ment error into our models. More detailed measures are needed to explore how claimant
characteristics associate with inability to meet Claimant Commitments and how these asso-
ciate with sanction rates. Third, our analysis cannot reveal whether those people sanctioned
are lone parents or individuals with disabilities (i.e., the ecological fallacy). However, our anal-
ysis builds upon qualitative research which suggests the sanctions process may disadvantage
these groups, thus there is theoretical consistency between our aggregate-level findings and
the individual-level findings reported elsewhere. Future work will be needed to explore these
important and unresolved issues; verifying whether these associations are consistent with the
individual-level data and whether these relationships are, in fact, causal.
Despite these limitations, ourwork has important policy implications. TheDWPdoes pro-
videVulnerabilityGuidance to Jobcentre Plus staff (Work andPensionsCommittee, 2015), out-
lining the personal circumstances and life events staff should consider when making a judge-
ment on whether claimants may need ‘additional support to enable them to access DWP ben-
efits’. Yet, this guidance continues to emphasizes that the aim for individuals is to follow stan-
dard Customer Journeys, and so concerns remained about the lack of guidance on what ex-
pectations are appropriate for vulnerable groups (Tyler, 2013). Our evidence reinforces these
concerns, highlighting how claimant characteristics may influence the ability of claimants to
comply with welfare conditionalities.
From a pragmatic viewpoint, policymakers may ask: does conditionality work? To date, in
the UK, there is little evidence that recent changes to conditionality have improved the quality
of job searches (Webster, 2016). Sanctions may have increased off-flow from JSA but without
increasing employment (Loopstra et al., 2015a). Moreover, there is little evidence sanctions
have changed the character or behaviour of JSA claimants, with many people receiving mul-
tiple sanctions (Webster, 2016). This is unsurprising if the background economic conditions
that enable people to find suitable employment are not also addressed. Sanctions may increase
demand for paid work but if there is no concurrent intervention in the supply of work, sanc-
tions will only lead to financial insecurity.
The Work and Pensions Select Committee’s report on sanctions observed that the condi-
tionality regime may have inadvertently set up some vulnerable groups to fail. We have found
that sanction rates are highest in areas where more claimants are disabled or lone parents (i.e.,
groups that are potentially less able to comply with welfare conditions), suggesting the proce-
dures of conditionality may be biased against those who are already at risk of social exclusion.
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Web Appendix 1: Descriptive characteristics for 175 local authorities over 2008/09 to
2014/15.
Variable N Mean St.d Dev Min Max
JSA claimants adversely sanctioned (%) 1205 3.54 1,25 1.03 9.42
JSA claimants referred to be sanctioned (%) 1205 7.41 2.72 2.21 20.42
JSA claimants who report a disability (%) 1205 28.27 12.64 0 100
JSA claimants who are lone parents (%) 1205 21.03 10.79 0 100
JSA claimants who are an ethnic minority (%) 1205 15.85 21.12 0 100
JSA claimants with high level of education 1205 15.65 11.29 0 100
(NQF level 4 or above) (%)
JSA claimants claiming for >12 months (%) 1205 19.45 8.84 3.17 41.25
JSA claimants aged 55-64 (%) 1205 1.72 0.84 0.31 6.04
JSA claimants aged 18-24 (%) 1205 27.73 4.63 13.78 41.32
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Web Appendix 2: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
adverse sanction rate, 2008 to 2014, adjusting for rates of employment and economic
inactivity
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1) (2)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.015** 0.015**
disability [0.0035] [0.0035]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.017** 0.017**
lone parents [0.0037] [0.0038]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0027 -0.0018
ethnic minority [0.0030] [0.0031]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0029 0.0023
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0035] [0.0034]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.056** 0.061**
for over 12 months [0.0067] [0.0068]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.11 0.070
[0.067] [0.068]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.024 -0.020
[0.015] [0.016]
Employment rate (%) 0.025
[0.023]
Economically inactive (%) 0.019
[0.031]
Constant 2.09** -0.24
[0.55] [2.48]
Observations 1205 1205
R2 0.35 0.35
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Web Appendix 3: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
adverse sanction rate, 2008 to 2014, adjusting for labour market slack
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1) (2)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.015** 0.0082*
disability [0.0035] [0.0032]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.017** 0.014**
lone parents [0.0037] [0.0031]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0027 0.0024
ethnic minority [0.0030] [0.0032]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0029 0.0058
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0035] [0.0034]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.056** 0.055**
for over 12 months [0.0067] [0.0074]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.11 -0.047
[0.067] [0.11]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.024 -0.020
[0.015] [0.016]
Unemployment rate (%) -0.019
[0.39]
Ratio of vacancies advertised in the job centre -0.026
and number of JSA claimants [0.019]
Constant 2.09** 2.47**
[0.55] [0.55]
Observations 1205 862
R2 0.35 0.23
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
The sample size in model 2 declines because of missing data on the variable measuring the
ratio of advertised job centre vacancies and the number of JSA claimants.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Web Appendix 4: Interaction model examining the association between disability and long
parents with adverse sanctions before and after the change in sanction regime
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.0059
disability [0.0037]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.012**
lone parents [0.0031]
Change in sanction rate after the reform 0.058
[0.27]
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.016**
disability x change in sanctions after reforms [0.0057]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are lone 0.012*
parents x change in sanctions after reforms [0.0060]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0023
ethnic minority [0.0027]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0022
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0034]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.029**
for over 12 months [0.0094]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 -0.080
[0.070]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.026
[0.014]
Constant 2.99**
[0.55]
Observations 1205
R2 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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SƾǇǌǂǍǂǏǂǍǒ ǍƾǌǍǌ
First, we include time dummies (indicators for each fiscal year), which controls for geographi-
cal correlations between local authorities that may confound the observed relationships, find-
ing that – as described above– sanction rates remain correlatedwith the proportion of disabled
and lone parent claimants but not the proportion of ethnic minority claimants (Web Appendix
5). We also reran our models including all local authorities, regardless of sample sizes in the
Annual Population Survey. We would expect this to bias our findings towards the null, given
the error associated with estimating the socio-demographics of claimants from small sample
sizes. Even including these local authorities, the associations we observed remained robust
(Web Appendix 6). Next, we restricted our sample to only local authorities with non-zero val-
ues on our measures of the socio-demographics of claimants (i.e., those with disabilities, who
were lone parents, in ethnic minority groups, or who were highly education). Although this
reduced the number of local authority observations from 1205 to 748, our findings remained
robust (Web Appendix 7). The same was true when we excluded local authorities where area
samples, implausibly, provided estimates that showed all claimants had these characteristics
(n=10) (Web Appendix 8).
We also examined how different specifications of model weighting affected our findings,
first examining if results change when no weights were included, and finding that our results
remain stable (Web Appendix 9), and then, instead, weighting by the Annual Population Sur-
vey sample size for each local authority and finding, again, that our results are qualitatively
unchanged (Web Appendix 10).
Data on adverse sanctions – as mentioned above – is only collected after various appeals
procedures have been completed. This may bias our results if certain vulnerable groups are
more likely to have their sanctions overturned. To explore this possibility, we examinewhether
sanction referrals (andnot just adverse decision) are also associatedwith the socio-demographic
composition of JSA claimants. Consistent with adverse sanction decisions, sanction referral
rates are higher when the proportion of claimants who are disabled is higher and where there
are more lone parents claiming JSA (Web Appendix 11).
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Web Appendix 5: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
adverse sanction rate, adjusting for time dummies, 2008 to 2014
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.0092**
disability [0.0033]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.011**
lone parents [0.0034]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an 0.0027
ethnic minority [0.0021]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high -0.00070
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0030]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming -0.036**
for over 12 months [0.010]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 -0.41**
[0.11]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 0.0042
[0.012]
Time dummies Y
Constant 2.46**
[0.52]
Observations 1205
R2 0.54
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Web Appendix 6: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
adverse sanction rate, including local authorities with small samples, 2008 to 2014
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.0040**
disability [0.0013]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.0048**
lone parents [0.0013]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0018
ethnic minority [0.0024]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0014
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0015]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.072**
for over 12 months [0.0052]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.14**
[0.048]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.0031
[0.011]
Constant 1.78**
[0.39]
Observations 2625
R2 0.29
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Web Appendix 7: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
adverse sanction rate, excluding local authorities with zero disabled, lone parent, ethnic
minority or highly educated JSA claimants, 2008 to 2014
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.020**
disability [0.0049]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.020**
lone parents [0.0037]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an 0.0019
ethnic minority [0.0024]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0020
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0054]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.059**
for over 12 months [0.0076]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.082
[0.079]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.020
[0.017]
Constant 1.73**
[0.63]
Observations 748
R2 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Web Appendix 8: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
adverse sanction rate, excluding local authorities with 100% disabled, lone parent, ethnic
minority or highly educated JSA claimants, 2008 to 2014
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.015**
disability [0.0037]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.018**
lone parents [0.0036]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0031
ethnic minority [0.0031]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0041
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0039]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.057**
for over 12 months [0.0068]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.11
[0.069]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.024
[0.015]
Constant 2.08**
[0.56]
Observations 1195
R2 0.35
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Web Appendix 9: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
adverse sanction rate, without weighting by the size of local authorities, 2008 to 2014
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.013**
disability [0.0032]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.014**
lone parents [0.0034]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0019
ethnic minority [0.0026]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.00052
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0031]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.058**
for over 12 months [0.0056]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.10
[0.061]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.018
[0.014]
Constant 2.10**
[0.51]
Observations 1205
R2 0.32
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Web Appendix 10: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
adverse sanction rate, weighted by number of JSA claimants, 2008 to 2014
Proportion of JSA claimants
adversely sanctioned
Covariates (1)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.013**
disability [0.0033]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.015**
lone parents [0.0032]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0019
ethnic minority [0.0026]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0016
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0032]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.055**
for over 12 months [0.0055]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.11
[0.060]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.020
[0.014]
Constant 2.10**
[0.48]
Observations 1205
R2 0.32
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Web Appendix 11: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
sanction referral rate, 2008 to 2014
Proportion of JSA claimants
referred for sanction
Covariates (1) (2) (3)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.064** 0.027** 0.014**
disability [0.0078] [0.0068] [0.0068]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.061** 0.038** 0.019*
lone parents [0.0086] [0.0071] [0.0065]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0095* -0.026** -0.016**
ethnic minority [0.0038] [0.0059] [0.0059]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.0013 0.015* 0.011
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0077] [0.0075] [0.0067]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.14** 0.26**
for over 12 months [0.013] [0.012]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.13 -1.64**
[0.15] [0.19]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.053 -0.26**
[0.032] [0.059]
Local-authority fixed-effects N N Y
Constant 4.27** 4.55** 11.5**
[0.33] [1.17] [2.01]
Observations 1205 1205 1205
R2 0.14 0.37 0.58
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
Model 3 includes local authority fixed effects.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
27
Web Appendix 12: Examining the association between lone parents and the sanction rate in
more detail.
First, we examined the correlation between the proportion of claimants who are lone par-
ents and the sanction rate (Figure 3), finding a strong positive association (r = 0.66. p <0.001).
This suggests that – consistent with our results – as the proportion of lone claimants increases
so too does the sanction rate for lone parents.
Figure 3: Association between the proportion of lone parent claimants and the adverse sanction rate
among lone parents at the aggregate level (Great Britain), 2008 to 2014
Notes: Source: nomisweb. Each observation represents one month (e.g., March 2011).
However, this correlationmaybe confoundedby something else, namely the policy changes
that are happening during this period which affect both the number of lone parents claiming
JSA and the sanction rate. To test this possibility, we estimate a time series regression model
which adjusts for the secular time trend during our sample period. We estimate this time trend
as both a linear relationship and as a second-order polynomial (allowing the temporal relation
to be a curve rather than a straight-line). We find this association remains at the aggregate
level ( = 0.11, p = 0.035), even after adjusting for the background changes in sanctions and
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lone parents.
These results do not, however, necessarily explain why our regression models suggest the
sanction rate increases when there are more lone parents claiming JSA while the national level
data suggests the opposite. One possible explanation is that the association between lone par-
ents and the sanction rate varies depending on what proportion of claimants are lone parents.
For example, imagine that lone parents are less likely to be sanctioned when they constitute a
smaller proportion of claimants but more likely to be sanctioned when they constitute a larger
proportion of claimants. In this scenario, lone parents would look like they are less likely to
sanctioned at the national level if, on average, lone parents constitute a small proportion of all
claimants. However, at the local authority level we may still see a positive association, espe-
cially among local authorities with a high proportion of lone parent claimants.
Figure 4: Testing whether there is a non-linear association between the proportion of lone parent or
disabled claimants and the sanction rate
Notes: We added a third-order polynomial to capture any differences in the direction of the association at very
high and very low levels of lone parents and disabled claimants.
We test this possibility by examining whether the association between the proportion of
lone parent claimants varies according to number of lone parents who are claiming.
29
We find that – consistent with our results and the aggregate-level data – the association be-
tween the sanction rate and lone parents is either flat or largely negative in LAswhere there are
few lone parents claiming but increases sharply if the proportion of lone parents is high>10%
(Figure 4). For example, if the proportion of lone parent claimants rises from 1% to 2% then
the sanction rate may well be lower. However, if the proportion of lone parent claimant rises
from 12% to 13% (around the average in the summer of 2014) then the sanction rate will go
up. This is not the case for the proportion of disabled claimants, which is a consistently linear
association.
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Web Appendix 13: Association between demographic characteristics of JSA claimants and the
demographic-specific sanction rate, 2008 to 2014
Proportion adversely sanctioned
Disabled Lone Parent Ethnic minority
claimants claimants claimants
Covariates (1) (2) (3)
Proportion of JSA claimants who report a 0.0042** 0.00073* 0.0030**
disability [0.0010] [0.00034] [0.0016]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are 0.0035** 0.0012** 0.0049**
lone parents [0.0010] [0.00033] [0.0019]
Proportion of JSA claimants who are an -0.0040** -0.000041 0.029**
ethnic minority [0.00076] [0.00028] [0.0017]
Proportion of JSA claimants that have a high 0.00024 0.00063 -0.0012
level of education (NQF level 4 or above) [0.0011] [0.00035] [0.0015]
Proportion of JSA claimants claiming 0.0047** 0.0024** 0.014**
for over 12 months [0.0018] [0.00064] [0.0033]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.094** 0.064** -0.19**
[0.020 [0.0088] [0.040]
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.0040 -0.0040* -0.049**
[0.0046] [0.0016] [0.0087]
Constant 0.56** 0.099 1.65**
[0.17] [0.057] [0.32]
Observations 1205 1031 1205
R2 0.24 0.46 0.74
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models include weighting by local authority size.
Model 3 includes local authority fixed effects. The sample size declines in model 2 (lone
parents) because of missing data on the dependent variable.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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